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CRITICAL ANALYSIS ON THE DEFEAT OF TASK FORCE RANGER

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Maj. Clifford E. Day

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Preface

This paper will critically analyze the 1993 military defeat of Task Force RANGER (TFR) in Mogadishu, Somalia while supporting the United Nations Operation in Somalia. The military defeat of TFR provides a myriad of lessons that must be applied to future military operations other than war if the US government and US military are to succeed in such endeavors.

This research project is not an attempt to personally attack the civilian and military leadership of the US, or discredit the heroic efforts of the personnel involved with TFR whose skill, bravery, and fortitude in completing a dangerous mission is a testament to America's soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen.

I would like to thank Major Ralph Millsap, Air Command and Staff College, for sponsoring this research effort and giving his support and guidance throughout the 1997 academic school year. In addition, I would like to thank Major Scott W. Merkle, formerly assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment, for his expert opinion and help with finding participants of the TFR mission. These soldiers, whose identity will not be revealed, provided essential information concerning key decisions that were made during the 3 October TFR mission.

Abstract

United States involvement in Somalia encompassed a myriad of missions that were structured in three distinct stages. It began with the humanitarian assistance mission, Operation Provide Relief. Operation Restore Hope, the second stage, was a combination of humanitarian assistance and limited military involvement. The final stage, UNOSOM II, involved a peace enforcement and nation building mission. On Sunday, 3 October 1993, the relative success of UNOSOM II suddenly turned violent when a US Task Force came under heavy fire from Somali gunmen. The US Task Force, code named Task Force RANGER, was ill-prepared to cope with the type of urban guerrilla warfare prevalent in Mogadishu, and ultimately led to mission failure.

This research paper will critically analyze this significant military defeat by uncovering the facts leading up to and during the mission. Once the facts have been uncovered, this paper will link the effects back to the causes of this disaster. Finally, this paper will propose alternative courses of action that may have improved the chance of mission success or prevented this disaster. In addition, these alternative courses of action should be used as learning tools for future operations other than war.

Chapter 1

Historical Facts Leading to the Demise of Task Force Ranger

The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town remains untaken.

—Sun Tzu¹

Events Prior to Task Force Ranger

In 1991, the government of Somalia was collapsing under the strife of a civil war. As most of the men took up arms, the agriculture and business of Somalia came to a stop, as rival clan warlords vied for control of the country. Over the next several months, widespread drought led to famine and the death toll mounted from starvation. Immediately, private volunteer organizations rushed to the aid of the Somalis; however, like the innocent people they endeavored to help, they could not survive and function in the ever more violent embrace of the armed factions being run by the clan warlords.² Due to the fact there was no longer any functioning government, the Somali warlords controlled the country and insisted that all food shipments be distributed through them, and also demanded that anyone wishing to provide their country with charity must pay them first. This payment was to ensure safe off-loading and convoy passage to food distribution points; however, the ruthlessness of the clans was such, they often looted the

very convoys they were escorting. Due to the barbaric lawlessness of the Mogadishu clans the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 751 in April 1992, establishing the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), whose mission was to provide humanitarian aid and facilitate the end of hostilities.³

UNOSOM I did not possess the resources, knowledge or personnel to properly conduct the mission and within a few months it was painfully obvious this first attempt to intervene in Somali culture, which lacked the moral background necessary for reform, proved futile. Due to the floundering UNOSOM I mission, coupled with the horrid images of starvation and death on the television every night, and a hotly contested election, the Bush administration responded by ordering US forces to support the UNOSOM I mission through strategic airlift, initiating Operation Provide Relief. During the six months of Operation Provide Relief, more than 28,000 metric tons of critically needed relief supplies were brought into Somalia by this airlift.⁴ Despite this reinforcement, the security situation in Somalia, and most notably in the city of Mogadishu, grew worse. As US and world opinion of the situation in Somalia eroded, President Bush announced the initiation of Operation Restore Hope in December 1992.

Under Operation Restore Hope, the US would both lead and provide military forces to a multinational coalition. This US led force was to bridge the gap until the situation in Somalia stabilized enough for it to be turned over to a permanent United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force.⁵ The mission of Operation Restore Hope was twofold: provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, and to restore order in southern Somalia. For nearly six months Operation Provide Relief clearly succeeded in achieving its mission of stabilizing the security situation with the clan warlords, thus staving off the

immediate threat of starvation throughout Somalia. Due to the success of this operation, plans were made to turn Operation Restore Hope over to a permanent UN peacekeeping force, and in March 1993, the UN peacekeeping force, code named UNOSOM II, was established.

UNOSOM II, the first ever UN directed peacekeeping mission, was commanded by Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir with retired US Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe acting as a special representative of the UN Secretary General.⁶ The UN mandate for UNOSOM II was based on three missions: disarm the Somali clans, rehabilitate the political institutions, and build a secure environment throughout the country.

Rather than being in charge, US participation in this operation was primarily conceived in terms of logistical support. Significantly however, the US was also asked to provide a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that would operate under tactical control of the Commander, US Forces Somalia (USFORSOM), US Army Major General Thomas M. Montgomery.⁷ The mission of USFORSOM was to conduct military operations to consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid, economic assistance, and political reconciliation in Somalia.⁸

The significant influx of the multinational peacekeepers, coupled with the aggressive UN mandate, ultimately threatened the Mogadishu clan warlords, and one in particular, Mohammed Farah Aidid. Aidid, a former Somali army chief of staff and leader of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), was the most powerful and most heavily armed clan warlord in Mogadishu. His SNA could call on thousands of fighters, supplemented by huge stockpiles of antitank rocket launchers, antiaircraft guns, mortars, light artillery

pieces, and even a few tanks.⁹ Heavily armed, the SNA displayed more discipline than most of the other militias in Mogadishu.

As the UN peacekeeping force moved out to conduct its UNOSOM II mission, Aidid cranked up his anti-UN and anti-American rhetoric through pirate radio broadcasts, staged demonstrations, and initiated confrontations with the UN peacekeeping force. Due to this antagonistic activity, on 5 June 1993, General Bir reacted by ordering his forces to seize SNA weaponry and shut down Aidid's pirate radio station.

Identified as the single greatest source of anti-UN agitation, Aidid's pirate radio station was one of the primary targets of the UN peacekeeping force. The mission for shutting down the radio station was given to the Pakistani Light Armor Brigade. Tipped off by sources within the UNOSOM II headquarters, Aidid's SNA militia were waiting in ambush for the Pakistani soldiers, and quickly eliminated the lightly armed column, killing twenty-four and wounding fifty more.¹⁰

Within one day of the massacre, the UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali, and the UN Security Counsel, with approval and sponsorship from President Clinton, passed resolution 837, authorizing action against those responsible. In accordance with the resolution, UNOSOM II was now empowered to arrest and detain those responsible "for prosecution, trial, and punishment" and to use "all necessary measures" to establish UN authority "throughout Somalia."¹¹ The UN and the US then focused their attention on Aidid and his clan of SNA militia to set an example that might deter other clan warlords from acting in similar light.

The secret manhunt for Aidid was on, however, Howe and Montgomery needed more firepower and requested it in the form of AC-130H Spectre gunships, and within days of

the request, they had them. The Americans and their UN allies immediately went right to work, eliminating many SNA targets such as Aidid's radio station, headquarters compound and home. They seized a number of SNA assets, weaponry, and territory through a series of successful raids over a two week period; however, the fugitive warlord, now underground, remained at large and still in charge of the SNA.

Even though these attacks on the SNA were successful, Admiral Howe still did not have his man, and the capture of Aidid now became his personal battle. Despite Montgomery's objections, Howe put a price on Aidid's head by ordering leaflets to be dropped in Mogadishu offering a \$25,000 reward for the capture of the warlord.¹²

After a few skirmishes following Howe's bounty, the SNA backed off a bit. During this short cease-fire, Howe sent the AC-130H Spectre gunships back to Aviano Air Base, Italy in an attempt to entice Aidid to bargain. Unimpressed by the American and UN attacks, threats, and attempts to get him to surrender, Aidid and his SNA kept the pressure on, and a series of mortar attacks on the American QRF heliport at the Mogadishu airfield demonstrated his persistence.

Task Force Ranger

Following these attacks, Howe and Bir became frustrated with the attempts to capture Aidid and requested some special assistance from the US by way of the US Army's 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Delta Force). They felt the Delta commandos placed in a joint mission with the QRF, and backed up with proper intelligence support would yield them their trophy. The forces they assembled and designated Task Force Ranger (TFR) were commanded by Major General William F.

Garrison.¹³ The fighting core of TFR would come from the Delta commandos and members of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Air support came by way of MH-60 Blackhawks and AH-6J Little Bird helicopters. Finally, a small team of intelligence gatherers, already in country and tied in with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) network endeavored to find Aidid and guide in the task force.¹⁴

After some orientation of the situation, TFR went right to work; however, the CIA intelligence team lost track of Aidid and could only guess at his whereabouts. After a series of raids based on incomplete intelligence, several key members of the SNA were captured, however, TFR repeatedly came up empty handed in their hunt for Aidid.

As these raids continued, Aidid struck back, letting it be known to UNOSOM II that he was still in action and still defiant. Although his SNA militia could not catch TFR, they could easily target the slower moving and more opportunistic targets of the UN and American QRF forces. So the skirmishing went on, Aidid probing, the UN getting shot, and the QRF reacting.¹⁵

After a series of SNA mortar attacks on the airfield and the shootdown of a US MH-60 helicopter by an SNA Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG), General Montgomery felt the situation was getting out of control and submitted a request for armor up his chain-of-command. The request was relayed to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin who disapproved it for fear of escalating the conflict to an unacceptable level.¹⁶ Despite this, Howe stayed adamant about achieving his objective to get Aidid.

The Demise of Task Force Ranger

Early in the afternoon of 3 October 1993, a Somali agent working for the CIA reported that key members of the SNA were planning to meet in a building near the Olympic Hotel in the Bakara Market district of Mogadishu later that afternoon at approximately 1500 hrs. With this limited information, TFR prepared to move out aboard fourteen helicopters and head to the objective. The tactics and equipment used would be the same as the previous raids, the Ranger security teams would “fast-rope” from the MH-60’s and seal off the objective. Once this was complete, AH-6J’s would bring in the Delta commandos who would enter the facility and snatch the perpetrators. Following the “snatch and grab,” a vehicle convoy, that departed the same time as the helicopters, would extract the Delta commandos, Ranger security teams and the detainees.¹⁷

The operation unfolded with only a few minor problems, but nothing that would have prevented a successful mission. At approximately 1540 hrs, TFR descended on its target. When the MH-60’s arrived over the target, the Ranger security teams quickly fast-roped to the ground in a cloud of dust kicked up by the helicopters. As the Rangers established security around the objective, the Delta commandos entered into the target building and started collecting Aidid’s operatives. Soon after, sporadic small arms fire started coming in, wounding several members of the security team. It had become apparent the SNA had reacted a few minutes faster than previous raids. At that moment the ground convoy pulled up, ready to extract the team and its prisoners. According to Lieutenant Colonel Danny McKnight, commander of the ground convoy, “Everything was going fine, we definitely achieved surprise. But when we started to load the detainees, everything changed.”¹⁸

The volume of enemy fire rapidly increased, however, this time it came in the form of RPG's. Several were fired at the vehicle convoy, knocking out a five-ton and a highly mobile multi-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). About five minutes later another volley hit an orbiting MH-60 (call sign Super 61), dropping it about three hundred yards east of the objective building. Even though they were well into the withdrawal phase of the raid, the ground commanders knew they could not leave the downed aircraft and its seven men, so they ordered a heliborne reaction team and members of the assault force to the crash site.

The rescue started with the recovery of two survivors by the crew of one of the AH-6J's that was hovering overhead. Second, the MH-60 heliborne reaction force comprised of Rangers and US Air Force Special Operations Forces (SOF) fast-roped nearly on top of the Super 61 wreckage.¹⁹ Just as the Air Force SOF personnel were about to touch ground, an RPG struck the hovering aircraft, which was able to limp back to the airfield after delivering its forces. Scrambling for cover from incoming rounds, the reaction team secured the area, beating the SNA to the crash site by minutes. The enemy arrived from all sides as hundreds of SNA gunmen, intermixed with women and children, started shooting at the reaction force.

The vehicle convoy tried to move toward the shattered helicopter, however, with only a general idea of the crash site and tormented by endless bouts of small arms and RPG fire, they got lost. Because of this, Garrison ordered McKnight to back out and get the prisoners back to TFR headquarters at the airfield in an effort to save the mission. As the vehicles began to pull out, a second MH-60 (call sign Super 64) was struck by an RPG while orbiting over Super 61 and plunged to the ground about two miles from the raid

objective. The second downed chopper finished off TFR's final fragment of flexibility; the time was approximately 1700 hrs.²⁰

General Garrison, at TFR headquarters, started recalling members of the QRF for a rescue mission. The force, comprised of TFR headquarters troops and members from a light infantry company, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bill David. David received a quick situation briefing from Garrison and led his force of twenty-two lightly armored vehicles into the streets of Mogadishu at approximately 1745 hrs. Within minutes, the convoy encountered a hail of RPG and small arms gunfire, damaging several vehicles and bringing the convoy to a halt. Under the heavy fire, the force dismounted their vehicles, took cover, and fought back. The men shot approximately sixty thousand rounds of ammunition, trying to drive away the growing ranks of the SNA militia.²¹ As David reported that his progress had been stymied, Garrison recalled the rescue force at 1821 hrs; however, it took David's team almost an hour to break contact and return to the airfield.

As the convoy broke contact, an air rescue attempt of Super 64 was initiated. An MH-60 (call sign Super 62) carrying two Delta Force snipers touched down about one hundred yards from the Super 64 crash site. After delivering the snipers, Super 62 tried to fly cover, but an RPG slammed through the cockpit, forcing it into a crash landing just short of the airfield. Without any air protection, and quickly running out of ammunition the rescuers succumbed to the intense volley of SNA fire.

As darkness came over Mogadishu, the ninety or so members of TFR had to hunker down and sweat out the night. As they reported to TFR headquarters that they were running out of ammunition, water, and medical supplies, Garrison and Montgomery knew

the situation was desperate and found themselves searching for armor support from their UN allies. The Pakistanis and Malaysians were the only UN forces in Mogadishu that could readily bring armor to the fight, and responded willingly. Now, under the pressure of an unforgiving clock and a ruthless foe, this polyglot ensemble would try one of the most difficult tasks in the military playbook, a night attack through a city to rescue the stranded members of TFR.²²

After an exchange of liaison teams between the US and UN forces due to the language barrier, the convoy, totaling over seventy vehicles departed for the Bakara district of Mogadishu at approximately 2330 hrs. The convoy consisted of four Pakistani tanks, twenty-four Malaysian armored personnel carriers (APC), two light infantry companies, and around fifty members of TFR.²³ The column had to advance street by street and building by building while laying down suppressing fire against the SNA small arms and RPG fire. It took nearly two and a half hours of fighting to get near where they thought the TFR perimeter was, but in the darkness and confusion, the rescue force could not pinpoint the task force's exact location, and broke into two sections in an attempt to find them.

The first column went to Super 61. Approximately five hundred meters from the crash site, the US forces dismounted under enemy fire and probed forward in an attempt to find their comrades. At 0155 hrs, after seeing flashes from infrared strobe lights, the rescue force linked up with TFR.²⁴ The second column proceeded to Super 64, arriving at approximately 0200 hrs, only to find nothing but a trail of spent brass casings and blood trails. The crew of Super 64 and the two Delta snipers were all missing.

Following the retrieval of TFR, the escape plan called for the columns to link up and return in reverse order; however, second column, finding nothing at the wreckage of Super 64, departed for the rendezvous point early. Instead of waiting, it proceeded to the site of the Pakistani base camp at the Olympic stadium. The first column, after picking up the stranded task force, also proceeded directly to the Pakistani base camp just as light was breaking (see Appendix A for a timeline of the raid events and Appendix B for a map of Eastern Mogadishu and the Bakara district).

In the strictest military interpretation, the 3 October TFR raid had succeeded, but the cost had been overwhelming: Nineteen American dead and missing, seventeen from TFR, and eighty-four wounded, sixty from TFR. One Malaysian died, and seven fell wounded, along with two Pakistanis wounded. Material losses included two helicopters destroyed and four seriously damaged, along with several vehicles either destroyed or severely damaged.²⁵

Notes

¹ Chailand, Gerard. *The Art of War in World History*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994.

² Bolger, Daniel P. *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s*, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995.

³ Allard, Kenneth. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, Washington, DC: Defense University Press, 1995.

⁴ Ibid., 3.

⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁶ Ibid., 3.

⁷ Ibid., 3.

⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁹ Ibid., 2.

¹⁰ Ibid., 2.

¹¹ Ibid., 2.

¹² Stevenson, Jonathan. *Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

¹³ Ibid., 2.

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¹⁴ Ibid., 2.

¹⁵ Ibid., 2.

¹⁶ Hackworth, David H. *Hazardous Duty*, New York: William Morrow and Company Inc., 1996.

¹⁷ Ibid., 2.

¹⁸ Ibid., 15.

¹⁹ Rhodes, Philip F. "No Time For Fear," *Airman*, May 1994: 23-31.

²⁰ Ibid., 2.

²¹ Ibid., 2.

²² Ibid., 2.

²³ Ibid., 15.

²⁴ Ibid., 15.

²⁵ Ibid., 2

Chapter 2

Effects and Causes of the Disaster

Usually before we have learnt what danger really is we form an idea of it which is rather attractive than repulsive. In the intoxication of enthusiasm, to fall upon the enemy at the charge—who cares then about bullets and men falling?

—Carl Von Clausewitz¹

The UNOSOM II operation was a new direction in international engagement for the US. It was neither a traditional peacekeeping mission nor a textbook military operation, but another form of operation other than war (OOTW) that sought to combine elements of each for a quick and productive political venture. Such departures from the beaten path often hold out great promise; at the same time, their pitfalls can be unexpected and costly, as was demonstrated by the outcome of this ill-fated mission.² The two significant effects of this military disaster were the failure of the UNOSOM II and TFR missions to capture Aidid, and the significant loss of life during the 3 October raid. This Chapter will examine these two compelling effects and trace them back to the causes that led to the demise of what many consider to be some of the most elite military fighting units in the world.

The Failed Missions of UNOSOM II and Task Force Ranger

From the outset, the mission of UNOSOM II seemed a bit farfetched and difficult to grasp. There were no manuals, regulations or doctrine for leaders to refer to. The

mission objectives of disarming the Somali clans, rehabilitating the political institutions and economy, and building a secure environment seemed simple enough on paper; however, when one is dealing with a country in the middle of a civil war, whose political leadership consists of clan warlords battling for status positions, it makes military intervention nearly impossible without some sort of major conflict.

During Operations Provide Relief and Restore Hope, the political objectives seemed clear, provide humanitarian assistance to the starving people of Somalia, and ensure the supplies make it to wherever they are going. However, the mission of UNOSOM II proved vastly different from the previous two in that it was more politically intrusive and more willing to use military power to enforce its goals. It was becoming painfully obvious to the to the clan warlords, and most notably to Aidid, these new mission objectives were creeping from feeding to fighting.

From the outset of UNOSOM II, difficulties arose from a lack of clarity and consistency in the policies of both the US and UN, and from a lack of agreement between them on what the Somalia operation was intended to accomplish.³ One of the major reasons for these indifference's was that the US role in Somalia went through several phases, which culminated in confusion about objectives and policy.

In 1992, the Bush administration was deeply involved with and avid supporters of Operations Provide Relief and Restore Hope; however, little consideration was given to the long-term issues of peacekeeping in Somalia. The Weinberger-Powell doctrine on intervention, designed to achieve limited, specific objectives with the support of overwhelming force if needed, had been well understood by the Bush team, but the incoming Clinton administration was occupied with many issues more important than

Somalia.⁴ Because of this, key issues of US policy in Somalia never attracted the attention of top decision makers. Instead, the Clinton administration left the key decisions to an interagency committee composed of lower ranking officials known as the Deputies Committee.

As Operation Restore Hope transitioned into UNOSOM II, both the US and UN gave less attention to the fundamental issues confronting Somalia such as the nature, prospects and timing of reconciliation, what would be needed to rebuild Somalia's institutions, how much to disarm and demobilize the militias, the best approach to the faction leaders, a clear definition of success, and the end state.⁵ Because of this, the political leadership of UNOSOM II reached their own judgments on the types of political reconstruction it considered appropriate for Somalia. A stunning example of this occurs following the SNA ambush that killed twenty-four Pakistani soldiers. Within one day of the event, the UN passed Resolution 837, authorizing action against those responsible. Admiral Howe, acting on this resolution, initiated a personal manhunt for Aidid, offering a reward of \$25,000 for the capture of the warlord.

If the mission of UNOSOM II seemed farfetched, then the mission of TFR bordered on the absurd. The overall mission of the US in Somalia had gone from feeding to fighting and then to direct action against Aidid. UN Resolution 837 required a full legal investigation before anyone could point a finger at any group or individual, and Howe promised to do just that; however, simultaneously and secretly, he called for help from the elite counter-terrorists of the Delta Detachment to snatch Aidid for trial.⁶ It was obvious the hunt for Aidid was to begin with or without a proper investigation. If Aidid was the

individual responsible, and he probably was, why did the raid that led to the demise of TFR ever take place?

As asinine as it was, How's personal hunt was only for Aidid, and the main reason for assembling TFR. However, Aidid had gone underground and the latest intelligence reports provided no leads. In fact, Aidid had not even been seen for over three months. TFR had completed six raids prior to the 3 October raid, each based on intelligence that could only provide guesswork as to the whereabouts of Aidid. The manner in which TFR conducted these raids was superb, however, their results were far from perfect in that they came away empty handed with respect to capturing the SNA chief, frustrating both the team and Howe. Because of this, TFR was ordered to change the mission standard and broaden its search to include key SNA lieutenants as well as Aidid.

The intelligence reports that centered around the 3 October 1996 raid were based on Aidid's lieutenants being at the meeting near the Olympic Hotel, not Aidid. So, General Garrison sent a team of his finest soldiers into the heart of SNA territory during broad daylight because it lowered its standards in an attempt to achieve success and validate the use of these highly specialized forces in Somalia. Following the disastrous raid, the leadership claimed, in the strictest military interpretation, the mission was a success, in that they had achieved what they set out to do; however, anyone can be a success if they set their standards low enough, which was exactly what the US military leadership did. Under the original interpretation of the mission standard, the 3 October raid was a failure.

The raid that led to the demise of TFR and ultimately UNOSOM II, failed because of several factors; however, the two major reasons why the SNA was able to conduct such a devastating attack on the technically and tactically superior US task force was due to poor

intelligence and repeated tactics. The US military has the capability to launch strategic nuclear weapons at targets across the globe and to tell the difference between actual and fabricated SCUD launchers from thousands of miles in space; however, the Defense Department's myriad of billion dollar technical intelligence equipment proved totally useless in Somalia with regard to the hunt for Aidid. Intelligence is the key to any operation, and the basic intelligence in MOOTW is provided by human intelligence (HUMINT). Most of the intelligence in Somalia came from CIA penetration agents organized into the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA). The ISA agents mainly consisted of individuals recruited from clans rival to the SNA, and led by a US CIA officer. The major problem with the ISA intelligence gathering was that the agents were easily spotted by the SNA, and the CIA officers, although wearing civilian clothes were as easy to spot as the uniformed troops. The missions of TFR required exact intelligence if their mission was to succeed, but, most of the intelligence gathered by the ISA was either partial, estimated, guessed, or often merely hoped.

An example of this faulty intelligence gathering can be seen in TFR's initial raid. General Garrison, acting on the "latest intelligence," decided on an attempt to capture the SNA warlord. After a perfectly executed strike on the facility they felt Aidid was hiding, the Delta commandos found eight men, none of whom was Aidid. In fact, the eight men they had apprehended turned out to be contract workers of the United Nations Development Program, and provided the media an opportunity to publish the embarrassing results.

General Garrison knew he had lost strategic surprise when the UN and Howe told Aidid he was a wanted man, but now, TFR had lost operational surprise with this failed

raid. Everybody now knew they were in Mogadishu and why they were there. Now only tactical surprise could help Garrison achieve his mission, by relying on speed to get in and out of areas so fast that the SNA could not have time to react.

Because of this, Garrison had to use a template approach in order to cut down reaction times. A standard footprint evolved, a quick fast-rope insertion of Rangers and Delta commandos into the tight streets and onto sagging roofs, and a rapid extraction, with the entire ground time not to exceed a half hour.⁷ TFR practiced several variations to this basic plan, such as day and night attacks, and ground insertions and extractions, however, it would be basically be the same thing every time. After completing five of these missions throughout Mogadishu, the SNA were finally catching on, thus limiting Garrison's tactical surprise. And on 3 October, in the heart of the Bakara District of Mogadishu, these suspicions were confirmed as the SNA rapid mobilized their militia under the footprint of another TFR raid and ambushed them.

In addition to leaving a standardized footprint from the previous missions, Garrison did not learn from previous mistakes made by the QRF. On 15 September, nearly a month after the arrival of the Delta Detachment, one MH-60 had already been shot down by SNA RPG's during a daylight raid on one of Aidid's compounds. Although RPG's are not normally used against air targets, Garrison should have realized the SNA were using them as such and planned accordingly. The reason why this "good" intelligence was not used during the 3 October raid was due to the fact that Garrison thought his team would be in and out before the SNA would even realize they were there; however, ignoring this intelligence, coupled with the footprint of the previous missions, were major factors leading to the SNA ambush of TFR. According to SNA Colonel Ali Aden, "If you use a

tactic twice, you should not use it a third time, the next time we would make the Yankees pay.”⁸

The failed mission of UNOSOM II stemmed directly from poor mission objectives and lack of clarity and consistency in the policies of both the US and UN regarding what the Somalia operation was intended to accomplish. The 3 October military disaster was the final act that led to the failure of the TFR mission and ultimately to the withdrawal of US and UN forces from Somalia.

The Significant Loss of Life

As the missions in Somalia changed from feeding to fighting, the equipment list should have changed to coincide with the missions as well. This was never more evident than in the case of TFR. Although the 3 October raid was a dangerous mission, it certainly did not warrant the number of men killed and wounded. There were a number of important decisions made by the political and military leadership regarding equipment, that most certainly would have significantly reduced the number of casualties, and quite possibly the outcome of this mission.

One of the first major decisions regarding equipment came prior to the establishment of TFR and involved the use of airpower. Upon initiating his secret manhunt for Aidid, Admiral Howe, through General Montgomery, requested and received four AC-130H Spectre Gunships. Upon arrival, the AC-130H's were used to surgically strike and destroy key SNA targets, and also flew support for the QRF while they conducted raids to disarm the SNA militia. However, within less than a month of their arrival, operational control of the AC-130H's was relinquished by Montgomery in order to incite Aidid to

give himself up. At the time, this was probably a good idea, however, when Aidid only increased the ferociousness and number of his attacks, Howe and Montgomery never recalled the aircraft. Had the AC-130H's been in Mogadishu at the time of the 3 October raid, they could have flown an offensive air mission to support the tactical withdrawal of TFR. As such, the only air support TFR received during the raid was from the MH-60's and AH-6J's, and they were not enough.

Another important decision relating to equipment that might have saved many lives during the raid was that of armor. Following the September shoot down of an MH-53 by RPG's, General Montgomery requested help in the form of armor. Montgomery's superiors, CINC CENTCOM, General Hoar, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, relayed the request but did not support it strongly enough to keep Secretary of Defense Les Aspin from stopping it.⁹ The reason Aspin gave was that sending armor could result in a military escalation which would hamper any chance of a political settlement with Aidid. Little did Aspin know that this decision would turn out to be a costly error. But what about the military leadership in Somalia? Why did they simply take no for an answer? The military leadership should have shown enough nerve to hammer the point home with General Powell, and if this still did not produce results, then they should have terminated the hunt for Aidid until they were able to receive the armor they so desperately needed. If TFR would have had tanks, even with the ambush, they would have gone in, knocked over the mud huts, put a steel cable around the tail of Super 61, and pulled the thing out.¹⁰ Instead, political and military leadership decisions needlessly put their troops in harms way without the proper equipment to successfully complete the mission.

Other important equipment decisions that might have saved lives not only came from political leaders and theater commanders, but from the tactical commanders as well. The decision made by tactical commanders not to employ M-203 grenade launchers or MK-19 automatic grenade launchers during the raid proved fatal. The M-203 is a breach loaded, single shot, pump action, manually operated, .40 mm grenade launcher used in conjunction with the M-16 rifle. There are a number of rounds that can be fired from this weapon, such as high explosive, armor piercing, smoke, gas, and illumination. The MK-19 is a link belt fed, crew served, fully automatic grenade launcher capable of firing over 100 rounds per minute, and usually placed on the roof turret of a HMMWV. The ammunition used with this weapon is the same as the M-203. As one could imagine, the M-203 and MK-19, with the proper rounds, could inflict great damage on an adversary.

Both these weapons were on the equipment list for TFR, however, they were left in the armory for the 3 October raid. Had they been employed, they would have saved the lives of many and probably would have thwarted the ambush. Due to the estimated short duration and insertion method of the mission, it could be understood why the decision was made to leave the M-203's of the raid and security teams behind. However, the decision not to mount MK-19's on the HMMWV's of the extraction convoy vehicles or employ M-203's, standard infantry squad weapons, with the soldiers protecting the convoy was inexcusable. The thought was that these weapons could have produced too many civilian casualties. Instead, the soldiers used M-16's with the standard 5.56 mm ball ammunition and .50 caliber machine-guns, weapons capable of equal destruction to civilians as the MK-19's were mounted onto the roof turrets of HMMWV's. Not employing weapons

with a potential kill radius of thirty meters as opposed to using weapons with a kill radius of a few inches proved fatal for nineteen Americans involved with TFR.

Another key factor resulting in the significant loss of life was the amount of time it took for reinforcements to reach the Rangers and Airmen who were securing the crash sites and casualties following the raid. Due to the operational chain of command of the task force and poor coordination, a delay of over eight hours occurred before the first reinforcements arrived to help the original raid teams.

Upon the arrival of General Garrison and his Delta commandos, there were questions concerning how they would fit into the operational chain of command. Since it was formed in 1987, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) always had the capability to run certain select projects directly for the president, independent of the regional commanders, and this setup was recommended for this mission.¹¹ However, General Hoar, CINC USCENTCOM, demanded Garrison report through him. Because of the time factor involved, and Aidid still on the run, a compromise was reached, with Garrison reporting through Hoar en route to the Pentagon and the White House, with a coordination line to General Montgomery, thus creating two separate US chains of command. Unfortunately, this setup left General Bir and Admiral Howe totally out of contact with Garrison and TFR. Due to the secrecy involved with TFR missions no other UN unit operating in Somalia knew of the 3 October raid until it was well under way. In fact, it was three hours into the raid before the UN forces understood that it was an ambush of a US unit that was the cause of all the weapons fire. The probability that TFR might need help from the UN forces had not even been considered. Because of this, it took the Pakistani and Malaysian armor regiments nearly five hours to gather their forces,

which were in different sectors of Mogadishu, in time to meet at TFR headquarters where the second rescue mission was being planned.

Another reason for the delayed rescue attempt was due to poor coordination with the US QRF prior to the raid. This poor coordination stemmed directly from the bifurcated chain of command of TFR. About twenty minutes before the raid, Lieutenant Colonel David and his lead unit, Company C, 2-24th Infantry were told to prepare for a potential reaction role for a mission that was about to take place. But to where and to do what? David and his leaders did not know, because they were not integrated into the mission.¹² Instead, they were sent to the university on the outskirts of Bakara District to await further orders. Following the shutdown of Super 64, David and his men received word to report back to TFR headquarters at the airfield in order to become integrated into a reinforcement mission rather than go the area of hostilities. From the university, the drive to the airfield took David approximately one hour, whereas the drive to the location of the bogged down TFR element would have only taken fifteen minutes. If David's unit was to be used in a reaction role, why were they recalled from the university when the battle was only fifteen minutes away? This question may never be answered, however, a faster reaction time from a location other than the airfield, may have saved the lives of many soldiers. The separate TFR chain of command, and the desire for secrecy by not fully integrating other US and UN units into mission plans, paid a heavy toll.

Notes

¹ Chailand, Gerard. *The Art Of War In World History*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994.

² Hirsch, John L. and Oakley, Robert B. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995.

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³ Ibid., 2.

⁴ Ibid., 2.

⁵ Ibid., 2.

⁶ Bolger, Daniel P. *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990's*, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995.

⁷ Ibid., 6.

⁸ Ibid., 6.

⁹ Hackworth, David H. *Hazardous Duty*, New York: William Morrow and Company Inc., 1996.

¹⁰ Ibid., 10.

¹¹ Ibid., 6.

¹² Ibid., 6.

Chapter 3

Alternative Courses of Action

When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to treaty stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice in the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and with an imposing force, the case is quite different.

—Henri Jomini¹

The destruction of TFR on 3 October 1996, for all intensive purposes, concluded US involvement in Somalia; however, the political and military leadership of the US must use the results of this operation as a learning tool to be applied to future MOOTW environments if they are to succeed. This chapter will provide several alternative courses of action the US political and military leadership might have employed to decrease the probability of such a disaster from occurring.

Provide Adequate Political Support to Field Commanders

The UN and US political leadership saw a need for using the military instrument of power in order to achieve the political objective of feeding the starving people of Somalia. After achieving limited success with Operations Provide Relief and Restore Hope, the US and UN decided on a tougher approach in trying to deal with the clan warlords of Somalia. UNOSOM II was the by-product of that decision, however, the new mission objectives of disarming the Somali clans,

rehabilitating the political institutions, and building a secure environment were vague, leaving the military commanders and political representatives in Somalia to fill the void.

Following the ambush of the Pakistani soldiers and the passing of UN Resolution 837, authorizing action against those responsible, the UN and US political leadership gave the leaders in Somalia authority to hunt for Aidid, thus increasing the military intensity of the mission. To conduct this mission, the US political and military leadership approved the formation of TFR; however, they failed to provide the necessary equipment to properly conduct the mission.

The minute the US and UN political leadership decided to escalate the military mission in Somalia, the alternative course of action should have been to put their equipment and weapons systems where their mouths were, most notably armor and firepower. In addition, the President and other top level decision makers within the administration should have been personally involved with the Somalia operation instead of leaving key decisions to the Deputies Committee. As a direct result of these political leadership decisions, UNOSOM II and TFR could not properly conduct the missions they were tasked to accomplish. If the political leadership intends to use the military instrument of power and put the lives of its soldiers on the line, then it is essential they be given top priority. In addition, military leaders tasked to accomplish missions without the proper support should show enough nerve to stand up to decisions that might needlessly place the lives of their personnel in danger.

Construction of a Viable Intelligence Gathering System

In Somalia, good intelligence was hard to obtain due to the difficulty in gathering it. The primary intelligence support provided to TFR came from the CIA penetration agents of the ISA, whose intelligence estimates concerning the whereabouts of Aidid proved to be anything but

good. When the CIA's most valuable Somali agent shot himself playing Russian roulette, the agency should have clued that there was something more dangerous about the people with whom they were relying on for information.² Additionally, the non-US nations involved with UNOSOM II relied on their own spy services for intelligence, and rarely shared this information with US forces.

Other intelligence related problems revolved around dissemination. Since there was not a functioning telephone system, dissemination of information was accomplished through satellite links; however, these links were for US eyes only for fear that sensitive information might be compromised. In addition, some of the other nations of UNOSOM II had a similar setup, and established similar rules as the US when it came to the sharing of intelligence. The selfishness on the part of the US and multinational forces, coupled with the overall unreliable intelligence gathering system were key contributors to lack of good intelligence that TFR so desperately needed in order to achieve its mission objective.

One alternative course of action that could have beefed-up the intelligence gathering system was for the CIA and military intelligence organizations to conduct a complete background check on the enemy with whom they were dealing. The US intelligence services tend to devote their energies to tactical details at the expense of deeper background.³ A deeper approach would have revealed that Aidid was not the type of individual the US and UN made him out to be, having trained extensively at Soviet and Italian military schools. Aidid knew military tactics, and was an expert at urban guerrilla warfare. Knowing this, the TFR leadership might have thought twice before attempting the ill-fated 3 October raid using the same tactics as the previous raids and in broad daylight.

Another alternative course of action that might have proved useful, deals with the recruiting of the ISA agents. The ISA agents recruited from rival clans by the CIA performed this dangerous duty not only because they hated Aidid, but also due to the exorbitant amount of the money they were paid. These agents were being paid for simply working with the CIA, and not for the accuracy of intelligence they were providing. Rather than paying these agents solely for being brave enough to spy, they should have been paid solely on the quality of intelligence they gathered and provided. Had the intelligence gathering effort been set up in this manner, TFR might have fared better by only having to conduct one raid to capture Aidid.

Finally, it is imperative that the intelligence gathering and dissemination system be set up to aid all commanders within an operation. Only the synchronization of intelligence efforts from all partners in a multinational coalition will ensure unity of effort. Each nation should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary to attain the best possible common understanding of threatened interests, and determine relevant and attainable objectives for achieving mission success.⁴ The UNOSOM II commanders should have established a multinational intelligence center, with representatives from each participating nation to facilitate the gathering and dissemination of information in Somalia. Had such a center been established, the sharing of information might have led to the location of Aidid.

Employ Decisive Force

In most instances, employment of decisive force is an essential element, if not the key element, for a military force if mission objectives are to be achieved. When the mission of UNOSOM II changed, so too should have the level of force. Decisive force entails more than just increasing the size of the force, it is a combination of troop increases, equipment increases, and

weaponry increases to match the level of force necessary to accomplish the mission. So, as the mission of UNOSOM II increased, the level of force, equipment, and weaponry either remained the same or decreased due to the decisions of the political leadership in Washington and the military commanders within Somalia.

One alternative course of action that could have aided TFR in employing decisive force would have been to employ with the weapons they were trained to use, most notably M-203 and MK-19 grenade launchers. The M-203 is an extremely powerful weapon when properly employed in a urban environment. In fact, the original .40 mm grenade launcher, the M-48, was invented specifically for the purpose of firing into buildings through window or door openings. Although a bit heavier than the M-16, the M-203 would have given the Rangers few, if any, problems while fast-roping from insertion helicopters, and would have provided them a significant increase in firepower at the objective. In addition, the M-203 has the capability of firing several different types of rounds as described in Chapter 2. One type of round that TFR might have employed is tear gas (CS). Employment of CS prior to and during the extraction phase might have provided the team additional time by temporarily incapacitating the SNA militia.

The MK-19 automatic grenade launcher could have easily been employed as a part of the extraction convoy. The weapons mount setup for the MK-19 on the roof turrets of HMMWV's is virtually the same as that of the .50 caliber machine-gun. Although this weapon's range is far greater than the M-203, the arming distance of the round is only 28 - 35 yards. This weapon would have proved useful by rapidly destroying targets that were either out of range or out of sight of the Ranger security teams. The reason why this weapon was not employed was that the military leadership was worried that it would significantly increase the non-combatant casualty

rate; however, the MK-19 also has the capability to fire CS rounds which would have virtually eliminated non-combatant casualties while increasing the time for the extraction.

Another alternative course of action that would have given TFR decisive force is air power. Although effective weapons systems, the MH-53's and the AH-6J's were the only air support provided for TFR missions. A squadron of AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters, an extremely potent weapons platform, was in country and available, however, they were never used during any of the raids, and could only provide limited effectiveness during the rescue attempts due to their lack of night capability. Although Army AH-64A Apache helicopters were not in theater, their superior night capability would have proved useful to TFR by flying combat air patrols (CAP) during the raids, and could have provided superior firepower during extraction phase of the 3 October raid.

At one point during UNOSOM II, and just prior to the establishment of TFR, military commanders had four AC-130H Spectre gunships at their disposal; however, General Montgomery, in an effort to incite Aidid to give himself up, relinquished operational control of these aircraft and sent them back to Aviano Air Base. Having this awesome weapons system flying CAP for the TFR missions would have undoubtedly made short work of the massed SNA militia during the 3 October raid, and probably would have saved the lives of many soldiers.

Other forms of air power that could have aided TFR on that ill-fated day are Air Force and Navy (providing a carrier battle group was near by) attack aircraft with the capability to drop just about any type of ordnance exactly where they want. In addition, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) could have been employed to gather intelligence after TFR had been pinned down. This intelligence could have been used to precisely locate both friendly and enemy forces which would have saved valuable time for the rescue team before they departed on their mission.

During the 3 October mission, TFR was simply outgunned. In order to achieve victory, the level of decisive force necessary to accomplish a mission must be equal to or greater than the enemy. The most powerful military force in the world was outgunned by a militia because of an inability and unwillingness to employ the decisive force necessary to accomplish the mission.

Take Advantage of Superior Technology

In a MOOTW environment, superior technology does not necessarily translate into victory; however, if used appropriately, it can significantly aid commanders and soldiers in accomplishing a mission. The United States is by far, the most technologically proficient military in the world, but if military commanders fail to take advantage of this technology, especially in a MOOTW environment, they would be subjecting soldiers to unnecessary risks. This chapter had already discussed some technological advantages that were never used during the 3 October raid, such as armor, aircraft, and weapons; however, there were other, less elaborate technology based items, that if properly employed would have proved useful to TFR.

One alternative course of action, regarding available technology, that should have been employed is use of night vision devices. No other military force in the world has the ability to rule the night better than the US, but General Garrison failed to take advantage of this technology and conducted a daylight raid in the heart of SNA territory. The MH-53's and AH-6J's used on the TFR raid both had the capability to operate at night using the Airborne Night Vision System (ANVIS-6). In addition, ground forces possessed the similar capability as the ANVIS-6 in the form of ANPVS-7 night observation devices. Both the helicopter crews and ground forces had received extensive training in night operations prior to their arrival in Somalia and were prepared to use this training had they been tasked.

Even though TFR had left its tactical footprint from the six previous raids, had these raids been conducted at night, their tactical footprint might not have been so conspicuous to the SNA. Furthermore, TFR might have been able to salvage the disadvantage of using the same tactics for six straight missions on the 3 October raid had it been accomplished during the hours of darkness using technology not available to the SNA militia.

Another alternative course of action employing the use of advanced and low cost technology was body armor. This technology would not have changed the course of the 3 October raid, however, it would have probably saved the lives of many soldiers. These vests weigh about twenty-five pounds and have new type of steel plating that is capable of withstanding projectile impacts up to and including 7.62 mm rounds. Incidentally, this is the same round that is fired from the AK-47 assault rifle, the weapon of choice of the SNA militia. The steel plates of the vest are removable, and are positioned on the front and rear. All the Rangers performing security detail for the 3 October raid wore the newly procured body armor, however, they were not allowed to bring the full set, because the leadership was worried about all the weight they would be carrying when they fast-roped down to the objective, even though this technique was previously exercised without incident. The decision was made to go in with only half the body armor, the front half, leaving nothing more than their fatigue jackets to protect their backs.⁵

This decision proved to be fatal for many of the Rangers of the security detail. In most circumstances, when an individual gets shot from a high velocity round such as a 7.62 mm, it normally would enter and exit the body. During the 3 October raid, most of the rangers that were shot in the back either died or received more serious wounds because the front plate not only stopped the projectile from exiting the body, but deflected it back into the body producing additional injuries. Properly using the body armor as it was designed would have resulted in

fewer casualties of the Rangers that were shot in the back during the raid. Improperly employing available technology is nearly as bad as not using it at all.

Ensure Unity of Effort

One of the major principals of military operations other than war and an important consideration in dealing with multinational operations is unity of effort. In order to attain unity of effort with multinational forces, commanders of US forces should follow some general principals. First, there must be a common understanding among all national forces regarding their overall mission and how this mission is to be achieved. Second, there must be a coordinated policy with respect to intelligence, rules of engagement, fratricide prevention, special operations forces, communications, and timing of operations. Third, multinational command level trust and confidence must be established early if mission success is to be achieved.⁶ The US commanders of UNOSOM II and most notably TFR failed to follow these principals in their personal attempt to hunt for and capture Aidid.

With respect to the first principal, there was no common understanding among the UNOSOM II forces and the US forces concerning the TFR mission. In fact, there was no understanding because this was a US only mission that was deliberately kept separate and secret from the missions of UNOSOM II, and its multinational commanders. Had a common understanding been reached with the multinational commanders concerning the mission to hunt for and capture Aidid, they may have been able to add to the effort in some way, such as using their armor for the extraction of the raid teams and detainees.

The second principal of developing coordinated policies had also not been achieved with the multinational forces with respect to the TFR mission. This principal is probably the most

important factor in determining unity of effort of a multinational force, especially in dealing with intelligence and fratricide prevention. Had coordinated policies regarding intelligence been developed with other multinational commanders, the hunt for Aidid might not have gone on as long as it did. By pooling the intelligence resources of the multinational forces and the CIA, TFR might have been able to pinpoint the exact location of Aidid, and not needlessly waste time, resources and personnel guessing at his whereabouts.

Because no coordinated policy dealing with fratricide prevention had been developed, and because the TFR missions were not coordinated with the multinational commanders, the multinational forces of UNOSOM II could have easily opened fire on the team, or been exposed to fire during the raids because they had no idea what was happening. Fortunately, this type of incident did not occur during any of the raids. Had a coordinated policy with respect to fratricide been developed, the multinational forces near the area of the raids would have been able to prepare themselves for what was coming.

Finally, the US forces did not trust or have confidence in the multinational forces in Somalia. The main reason for this remains unknown, however, language barriers, doctrinal differences, arrogance, and varying capabilities were probably significant contributing factors. These are problems that should have been addressed at the start of the UNOSOM II mission. Better command level integration and coordination could have eliminated each of these three shortcomings, thus building the necessary trust and confidence essential to building and maintaining a strong team.

Notes

¹ Chailand, Gerard. *The Art of War in World History*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994.

Notes

² Stevenson, Jonathan. *Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

³ Ibid., 3.

⁴ Joint Pub 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*, 5 May 1995.

⁵ Ibid., 2.

⁶ Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, 24 February 1995.

Chapter 4

Summary

You should not have a favorite weapon. To become overfamiliar with one weapon is as much a fault as not knowing it sufficiently well...it is bad for leaders to have likes and dislikes.

—Miyamoto Musashi¹

From the outset, the missions of UNOSOM II and TFR far exceeded their grasp. Both missions were ill prepared to deal with the SNA's urban guerrilla movement in Mogadishu, and the US political and military leadership was not willing to commit the warpower necessary to carry out the difficult tasks they were assigned. The initiation of TFR meant the US was going to war with the SNA, a reality the political leadership was never willing to admit to. Because of this, the President and other key military leaders attempted to limit the conflict by placing their exclusive trust in the hands of General Garrison and his elite detachment of special warriors. Although TFR was made up of some of the most skilled military forces in the world, by relying on one small force, no matter how good they were, left little tolerance for friction in battle with an enemy that was grossly underrated.²

The reasons for the devastating outcome of the 3 October raid were evident: mission objectives that were not fully supported by the political leadership, such as disapproving the request for armor; an inadequate intelligence gathering system; a lack of coordination between

TFR, the QRF and UN forces; and military leadership decisions that limited the effectiveness of TFR, such as the tactics employed and not using firepower that was readily available.

Based on the outcome of this disaster, it was apparent, the US political and military leadership had not learned its lesson from previous, similar operations, namely Beirut. The situation in Somalia was virtually a mirror image of the Beirut operation that took place ten years earlier, almost to the month: a start in August, a different type of mission by December, a chance to withdraw the following May, increased tensions between opposing forces over the summer, a shattering disaster in October that resulted from poor political and military leadership decisions, and following that disaster, a buildup to cover a pullout in March. Similarly, each mission terminated with nothing resolved.³ However, the outcome in Somalia was even worse than Beirut because it followed that operation.

The significant military defeat of TFR has shown that the US political and military leadership did not learn from the mistakes that led to the disaster in Beirut. This research project has identified many of the problem areas that led to the debacle in Somalia and proposed several alternative courses of action that might have helped TFR achieve mission success. These courses of action must be applied to future MOOTW if the US government and US military are to succeed in achieving mission success. For the sake of every soldier killed in action during the 3 October raid in Mogadishu, Somalia, I certainly hope the US has finally learned from its mistakes when using the military instrument of power in operations other than war.

Notes

¹ Musashi, Miyamoto. *A Book of Five Rings*, translated by Victor Harris (Woodstock, New York: The Overlook Press, 1982).

² Bolger, Daniel P. *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990's*, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995.

³ Ibid., 2.

Appendix A


Chronology of the 3 October Raid

| <u>APPROXIMATE TIME</u> | <u>EVENT</u> |
|--------------------------------|---|
| 1300 hrs | ISA agent reports that several key SNA lieutenants are planning a meeting at 1500 |
| 1530 hrs | TFR boards helicopters |
| 1540 hrs | TFR initiates the raid |
| 1545 hrs | Rangers establish security |
| 1600 hrs | Delta commandos secure prisoners |
| 1610 hrs | Super 61 shot down by SNA RPG's |
| 1615 hrs | Lt Col McKnight ordered to bring prisoners back to airfield |
| 1620 hrs | Super 64 shot down by SNA RPG's |
| 1630 hrs | Lt Col David ordered back to the airfield |
| 1724 hrs | Lt Col David arrives at airfield |
| 1747 hrs | Lt Col David leads first rescue mission |
| 1754 hrs | Rescue force comes under heavy fire |
| 1821 hrs | Lt Col David ordered back to airfield |
| 1830 hrs | Super 62 attempts rescue of Super 64 crew |
| 1910 hrs | Lt Col David arrives back at airfield |

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| 2245 hrs | Pakistani and Malaysian armored forces arrive at airfield for mission briefing |
| 2324 hrs | Second rescue mission initiated |
| 0024 hrs (4 October) | Relief column splits up |
| 0155 hrs | First column arrives at TFR perimeter |
| 0200 hrs | Second column arrives at Super 64 |
| 0530 hrs | Rescue convoy reaches Pakistani base |

Appendix B

Map of the Bakara District and Location of the 3 October Raid¹



Notes

¹ Bolger, Daniel P. *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990's*, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995.

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- Joint Pub 0-2. *Unified Action Armed Forces*, 24 February 1995.
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